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The use of surveillance for purposes of crime prevention and detection as well as
investigation and prosecution of crime has important benefits to society. The rise of
urbanisation, technological growth and increase in information, capital and human
movement as a result of globalisation, state surveillance or intelligence activity are
increasingly perceived as an important tool to deal with the threat of organised crime
and international terrorism. However, the use of surveillance by enforcement agencies
can be regarded as an exercise of overwhelming state power. As the use of surveillance
is necessarily secretive and hidden, it creates an imbalance in power relation between
the state and the people that it govern. Such a condition of imbalance make the practice
of surveillance vulnerable to abuse or misuse which may affect not only the integrity of
the state in the eyes of its citizen but also the ethical standing of law enforcement
bodies. The use of surveillance also creates significant risk to individuals' privacy and
autonomy. If such use is pervasive enough, surveillance may inhibit society and limit its
ability to generate ideas and progressive thoughts. Consequently, enforcement bodies
power of surveillance need to be subjected to a high degree of control in terms of legal
and democratic accountability. Various democratic mechanisms and regulatory
framework need to be put in place to ensure that the use of surveillance is accounted
for and not abused. It must also be admitted that the control of surveillance by state
bodies are not without debate. Often, the debate revolves around the degree and nature
of control that must be imposed upon the exercise of surveillance. However, it remain
the case that the overwhelming risk posed by the state power of surveillance should nto
persist without democratic and legal control.
The paper has a very limited aim: to look at the laws in Malaysia that provides for the
powers of surveillance and consider whether there are in place sufficient legal and non-
legal controls over the power of surveillance of enforcement bodies in Malaysia. If it is
found that some forms of improvement are necessary, the paper will offer suggestions
for the future governance of surveillance practice by enforcement bodies in Malaysia.
Reference will be made to the laws in the United Kingdom - primarily the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 - to provide some comparison.
A. Backgrounds to the Laws and Practice of Surveillance in Malaysia
A discussion on the laws and practice of surveillance in Malaysia has to be based on some
legal-political backgrounds. These backgrounds could provide some degree of
explanation as to the nature of the laws that govern or provide for surveillance in
Malaysia. The need for governance of state surveillance activities can be discussed in the
light of two critical backgrounds:
1. an absent of a right to privacy
(i) The Federal Constitution does not recognised privacy as one of its fundamental
rights. In PP v Hj Kassim [1971] 2 MLJ 115, the Federal Court was asked to consider
whether article 5 of the Federal Constitution regarding the right to life and liberty
can be extended to include the notion of privacy. If that was the case, the trial judge
could not allow a confidential communication between a patient and his psychiatrist
to be admitted in evidence. The Federal Court instead held that the trial judge had
to adhere to the provisions in the Evidence Act 1950 which provided that, when a
fact is admissible, a trial judge is under a duty to receive it unless it can be excluded
as provided by sections 24 and 25. The Federal Court however, did not take the
opportunity to consider the possibility of such an extension to the meaning of the
right to life and liberty under article 5.
(ii) In the case of Ultra Dimension Sdn Bhd v Kook Wei Kuan1 the High Court of Kuala
Lumpur held that there is no right to privacy under the common law in Malaysia and
that there is no tort of invasion of privacy, referring to the English decision of Kaye v
Robertson 2
(iii) The proposed data protection regime under the Personal Data Protection Act has
never materialised. The proposal was conveyed to the public in 2000 as part of the
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) cyberlaws. Such a data protection regime could
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protect the information privacy of Malaysians and limit how the government collect
and handle personal data.
2. Rigorous use of enforcement powers for purposes of protecting national security
and public order.
(i) Various proclamations of emergency, including that of 1969, are still in operation and
provide justification for laws and criminal enforcement practice that are focussed on
preventing and curtailing threats to national security and public order.
(ii) Security legislations like the Internal Security Act 1960 and ESCAR19753 have been
rigorously applied, initially to tackle the threat from communist insurgent and lately,
alleged Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups like Jamaah Islamiah and Kumpulan Militan
Mujahidin. However, the ISA 1960 has received criticisms for its application against
lesser threats.'
(iii) The use of security laws and state powers on the ground of protecting national
security and public order could be a dominant influence in the use of powers of
surveillance. Such justifications could also hinder further governance of surveillance.
B. Powers of Surveillance under Malaysian Laws
Malaysia does not have an omnibus laws that govern various aspects of surveillance
powers like the United Kingdom Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. However,
there are statutory provisions that provide for powers of surveillance whether directly or
indirectly. On the other hand there is a large area of surveillance practices that are in
need of legislative control. This paper will focus on two aspects of surveillance that
have some degree of statutory basis: interception of communication and data
surveillance.
1. Interception of Communication
Interception of communication often refers to the interception of telephone, electronic
or radio communication. A common example of interception of communications is
telephone tapping. Section 6 of Communication and Multimedia Act 1998 (or CMA 1998)
could provide some assistance:
3 Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 197 (P.U.(A) 362)
~ for example, see the Federal Court decision in Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara &
Other Appeals [202]4 MLJ 449
"communications" means any communication, whether between
persons and persons, things and things, or persons and things, in
the form of sound, data, text, visual images, signals or any other
form or any combination of those forms;
"intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any communications through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other equipment, device or apparatus;
However, a wider notion of interception of communications would include intrusion into
correspondence in the form of interception of postal articles. It may also include the
recording of real conversation using covert listening device. The discussion the will
focus on the interception of communication in the sense of section 6 of the CMA1998 as
well as interception of postal articles. There is no law in Malaysia that govern the use of
covert listening device or similar forms of technical surveillance.
Prohibition against interception of communications
In general, the CMA 1998 section 234(1), criminalise interception of communications
and disclosure of the content of any communication, unless the interception and
disclosure is made with lawful authority under the CMA 1998 or any other written law.
Section 234 (1) even make it an offence to use or attempt to use the content of any
communications that has been obtained through unlawful interception. The power to
prosecute for offences under the CMA1998 is in the hand of the Public Prosecutor since
his written consent is required before any prosecution can be instituted."
Lawful interception of communications
(i) power to intercept communication in relation to investigation into specific type of
offences.
A number of statutory provisions provided for interception of communications in relation
to specific type of offences. These provisions are:
(a) Communication and Multimedia Act 1998, section 252,
(b) Anti-Corruption Act 1997, section 39,
(c) Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 1983, section 27A,
(d) Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture Of Property) Act 1988, section 20, and
(e) Kidnapping Act 1961 (Revised 1989), section 11.
5 (section259)
As an example, section 252 of the Communication and Multimedia Act 1998 provides the
Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Commission (or any 'authorised officer') with
the power to intercept communication in relation to an investigation into an offence
under the CMA1998 or its subsidiary legislations.
In addition to the provisions above the recent amendment to the Criminal Procedure
Code provides for the interception of communications to deal with terrorism. According
to section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amended) 2006 (Act A1274),6 the amended
Criminal Procedure Code will now include a specific provision that empower the Public
Prosecutor to authorise interception of communications to deal with terrorism offences.
The provision also empowers the Public Prosecutor to authorised interception of postal
articles. Under the soon-to-be-added section 106c(1) Criminal Procedure Code,
notwithstanding any written law, the Public Prosecutor, if he
considers that it is likely to contain any information relating to the
commission of a terrorism offence, may authorize any police officer
(a) to intercept, detain and open any postal article in the course of
transmission by post;
(b) to intercept any message transmitted or received by any
telecommunication; or
(c) to intercept or listen to any conversation by telecommunication.
According to the amended section 106A, "terrorism offence" means a terrorist act or a
terrorism financing offence. However, the amended Criminal Procedure Code does not
provide further definition to these terms. Instead, the amended section 130B(2),
Chapter VI A of the Penal Code7 provide a list of broad and expansive definitions of a
'terrorist act' which include 'act or threat of action ...that ...involves prejudice to
national security or public safety'.
The powers to intercept communication under these provisions suffer from very serious
lack of accountability and scrutiny particularly at the point of the authorisation of an
interception. Specifically, the problems are as follows:
6 the statute received the Royal Assent on 27 September 2006 and was gazetted on 5 October, 2006, the
amendments are not yet enforced.
7 Yet to be in force.
(a) The primary problem with the above provisions is the granting of unaccountable
and unguided power to the Public Prosecutor to authorise interception of
communications.
(b) There is clearly no prior scrutiny by a judge before an interception can be
authorised because no judicial warrant is required for an interception. Only the
Public Prosecutor is empowered to authorised interception.
(c) In contrast, various statutes that provide powers of investigation to enforcement
bodies, including the CMA19988 requires a search warrant to be authorised by a
Magistrate before a search can be conducted on any premises. The American
approach, for example, is to draw a parallel between interception of
communications with search and consider it unlawful for an interception of
communication to be conducted without a judicial warrant."
(d) These provisions above do not require strenuous justifications before
interception can be authorised. Basically, the Public Prosecutor may authorise an
interception if he considers that such a method could yield information that
could provide evidence into the offence in question. Although, an authorisation
of interception of communications under the amended section 106c(1) Criminal
Procedure Code will require
(e) In comparison to the provision under the United Kingdom Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, there is no requirement that the Public
Prosecutor must be show that the use of interception of communications is
•proportionate' to what it seek to achieve. 10 This may result in indiscriminate
and even excessive use of interception of communications for investigating those
offences. The use of interception of communication could be disproportionate to
the intrusion of privacy that it may caused and therefore, other means of
investigation should be considered and exhausted. In contrast, the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides that the Interception of Communications
Code of Practice" that must be followed before a warrant can be authorised.
(f) The provisions under the Malaysia statutes does not require the Public Prosecutor
to specify any condition or time limit on the authorised interception of
communications. On the other hand, a warrant would not simply act as a judicial
approval for the interception; it could specify detail requirements and conditions
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operation. Again, these requirements are practically useless unless there is an
independent supervisory body to scrutinise and hold the practice accountable.
The CMA1998 section 252 can also be criticised for giving disproportionate power to use
interception of communications in relation to various types of offences that are covered
by the Act. Most of these offences are not 'serious offences' because CMA 1998 is
fundamentally legislated to regulate convergence of media as well as supporting the
growth of the ICT industry in Malaysia. Only a number of offences that relates to
disruption or abuse of communication networks (such as in sections 231 to 235) may
justify some use of interception of communications. Clearly, section 252 ought to be
more specific as to the nature of offences that justifies the use of interception on
communications.
(ii) Interception of Communications under Special Powers in Emergency
Enforcement bodies, especially the police, are enabled with a more general and
expansive power to intercept communication for reasons of emergency and national
security.
(a) interception of communications for purposes of tackling public emergency or in
the interest of public safety under the CMA 1998.
The CMA 1998 section 266(1) (c) provides that on the occurrence of any public
emergency or in the interest of public safety, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong12 (or the
Minister authorised by him) may order for interception of communications. The CMA
1998 does not define 'public emergency,' but the meaning could be reflected against the
power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to proclaim emergency under Article 150 of the
Federal Constitution in expectation of or under actual 'grave emergency ...whereby the
security, or the economic life, or public order in the Federation or any part there of is
threatened.'
12 The Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the Supreme Head of the Federation of Malaysia (article 32 of
the Federal Constitution). Though, as a constitutional monarchy, article 40 of the Federal
Constitution requires the Royal Highness to exercise his constitutional and statutory power
according to the advice of the Cabinet (except in very limited and notional circumstances as
provided by the Federal Constitution).
(b) interception of communications under ESCAR197513
Under the Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 197 (P.U.(A) 362)
regulation 23 (1),
The Public Prosecutor may, if he considers that any articles or
messagesent through the post or telecommunications are likely
to contain any information relating to a security offence,
authorise any police officer either orally or in writing
(a) to intercept, detain and open any postal article in course of
transmission by post;
(b) to intercept any message transmitted or received by any
telecommunication; or
(c) to intercept or listen to any conversation by telephone.
This power to intercept communications under ESCARis only exercisable in relation to a
'security offence' which is define in regulation 2 as an offence against section 57,58, 59,
60, 61 or 62 of the Internal Security Act. But it could also includes statutory offences the
commission of which is certified by the Attorney-General as affecting the security of the
Federation. The nature of offences that are covered under section 57,58, 59 of the ISA
1960 are offences connected to the carrying, possession, supplying and receiving of
firearms, ammunition or explosives", while section 60 ISA1960 relates to any failure to
report those offences. Sections 61 and 62 relates to attempts to commit those offences
and assisting a person who has committed those offences.
(c) interception of postal communications under the Postal Services Act 1991
According to section 7(1) of the Postal Services Act 1991, the Yang Oi pertuan Agong may
authorised the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (or any other
authorised government officer) to intercept and disclose the content of 'any postal
article or class of postal articles' - 'on the occurrence of any industrial unrest, strike,
lockout or any other event which gives rise to an emergency, or in the interest of
national or public security'
13 ESCAR1975wasoriginally an emergencyregulation madeunder section 2 of the Emergency
(Essential Powers)Ordinance No.1, 1969 which is now replaced by Emergency (Essential
Powers)Act 1979Act 216. ESCAR1975is a subsidiary legislation made under an ordinance
promulgatedby the Yangdt-Pertuan Agong,in the exerciseof his power under Article 150of
the FederalConstitution, in relation to the 1969Proclamationof Emergency.
see Appendix II.
The power of interception of communications under the CMA 1998 section 266(1) (c),
ESCAR1975 regulation 23, and Postal Services Act 1991 section 7(1) - which deal with
states of emergency as well as threats to security and public order - can be criticised
for a number of reasons.
(i) The provisions are expansive in that they may allow interception of
communications on the ground of protecting security and public order. ESCAR
1975 permits the use of interception of communications on other offences
that have been certified by the Attorney-General" as 'affecting the security'
of the country. Consequently, ESCAR1975 bestows the Attorney-General with
unlimited power to certify any offences as a 'security offence and then acted
as the Public Prosecutor to authorise a police officer or conduct interception
of communications in relation to those offences.
(ii) The authorisation and exercise of interception of communications under the
provisions lack judicial and legislative scrutiny, accountability and control.
(iii) Beside similar criticisms above as to the overt power of the Public Prosecutor
under regulation 23 of ESCAR 1975, it is clear that interception of
communications for purposes of dealing with threat to security and public
order can be applied limitlessly as the provisions have entrusted the
Executive to make decision without proper accountability and scrutiny. As an
example, section 7(4) of the Postal Services Act and section 266(1) of CMA
1998 does not require detail explanation for the use of interception of
communications. Hypothetically, these two provisions could allow a
disproportionate and persistent use of surveillance over an unspecified period
of time.
Presumably, the exercise of the power to intercept communications these provisions are
to be utilised in the face of impending or ongoing state of emergency; but the facts that
these statutes have endowed complete discretion of the Executive is a matter of grave
concern fundamentally the lack of formal legislative or judicial scrutiny could result in
arbitrary and pervasive use of interception of comrnunicattons." The requirement for
communication and network service providers to make ready interception of
communications facilities under the section 265 (1) the CMA 1998 further illustrate the
desire maintain the power of surveillance.
15 Under article 145 of the Federal Constitution, the Attorney-General is appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong, apparently under the advice of the Cabinet.
see for discussions on the position of emergency laws in relation to the Constitution see, Lee.H.P. (1995)
Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
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2. Data surveillance
Law enforcement requires access to data for purposes of preventing, detecting and
prosecuting crime. This data provide what is known as criminal intelligence information
and may not always be used for purposes of criminal evidence. Criminal intelligence
information may be amalgamated from various sources: publicly available information,
third parties data holder and direct surveillance(data in the form of photos and audio
recordings). The advent of computerisation provide legal enforcement bodies with
possible access to disparate computer databases. Computerisation too could enable
enforcement bodies to gather, store and process large amount of data. Extensive data
search and process can be supported by technologies of data mining and data matching
which may help enforcement bodies to generate profiles of suspects or criminals.
Data surveillance may involve covert and non-consensual gathering of data and could
target individual persons as well as non-human entities like organisations or
corporations. The nature of data that is gathered may range from individual private
information to confidential business information. Covert and non-consensual access to
data create serious problem to private bodies in terms of loss of confidentiality and
control over their business information. So far, there is little recognition of private non-
human entities right to information privacy as it is difficult to draw such a parallel to
human demand for privacy. However, there are concerns that data surveillance might
be abused for purposes of economic espionage or even blackmailing.
This discussion, however, will focus on the impact of undisclosed access to and secret
gathering of personal data from the perspective of individual desire to information
privacy." The notion of information privacy can be described as an individual's right to
control access to his/her personal information and his/her right to control how others
handle his/her information. An infringement of information privacy therefore includes
direct informational intrusion as well as abuse of personal information in the hand of
third parties. In general, concerns about data surveillance from the perspective of
information privacy revolve around these aspects:
i. surreptitious or non-consensual collection of personal data whether directly
of from third parties;
ii. the accumulation of personal data in law enforcement database; and
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iii. the handling of those data especially in terms of their sharing, accuracy and
ultimate disposal.
Hence, the practice of data surveillance need to be govern from the following
perspective:
i. the power to access personal information, albeit surreptitiously and often in
the hand of a third party, must be based on clear laws;
ii. the law must provide for prior authorisation as well as external modes of
scrutiny and accountability;
iii. access to data must be based on legitimate grounds and govern by the
requirement of necessity and proportionality;
iv. the actual gathering, storing and handling of the data must be transparent for
purposes of accountability and scrutiny by a relevant supervisory body.
v. the data in the possession or control of an enforcement body must be handle
according to data protection or fair information principles, without
jeorpadising investigation, national security and public order.
Laws empowering access to data
Laws that provide for investigatory powers naturally provide relevant enforcement
bodies with the power of search in order to gather information and data for purposes of
investigation. There are various statutory provisions which provide for the power of
search as well as the power to compel production of or give access to information. Key
concerns about such legal powers revolve around the potential for abuse of those data,
particularly if they are used for purposes unrelated to the investigation such as the
gathering of intelligence information. It is necessary to look at some of the provision ad
consider among all whether there are sufficient safeguards in place.
There is no compelling constitutional duty to conduct search with a warrant. Although
the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the power of search (of person and premises)
with a judicial warrant, it permits search without a warrant under 'urgent'
circumstances such as where an application of a warrant could hamper an impending
access to evidence. Specific criminal statutes and statute that empowers enforcement
bodies also provide specific powers of search, often allowing search without warrants.
The power to search premises may enable the relevant enforcement officers to gather
evidence that may help in the investigation and/or prosecution of a crime. However, a
number of statutes has given powers to enforcement bodies to access data in computers
that are obtained during the search. Two of the most critical legislations are the
Computer Crimes Act 1997 and the CMA 1998 which provides for access to computer
data.
Section 10 Computer Crimes Act 1997 18 (or CCA 1997) provides for the search of
premises by a warrant from a Magistrate (or without one if there is an urgency - believe
that warrant will frustrate investigation) where the police has reasonable cause to
suspect that there is evidence of a commission of offence under the CCA 1997. The
provision is wide enough to enable the police to access computer files or data regardless
of whether they are in the hand of a suspect.» This might include cases where the data
are in the possession of an internet service provider or even in the server of a web
hosting company. In addition, section 10(1) (b) empowers the police to compel a person
who has control or access to the computer (in terms of security access codes and
encryption) to provide asststance.s
Similar power can also be found in section 249 of the CMA 1998. Under that provision,
a police officer conducting a search of premises (for the purpose of enforcing the CMA
1998) either with a warrant (section 247) or without a warrant (section 248) can compel
access 'to computerised data whether stored in a computer or otherwise'. This provision
is even wider than the CCA1997 because the police officer can require for the provision
of 'necessary password, encryption code, decryption code, software or hardware and
any other means required to enable comprehension of computerised data' to access the
data in the computer. In addition, he may also gain 'access' to the data by making
copies of the data stored in the computer.
However, and anomalously enough, there is no requirement for a warrant before an
'authorise officer' (which normally mean an officer of the Malaysian Communication
Multimedia Commission) can have access to computerised data.According to section
254 CMA 1998,
An authorised officer shall, for the purposes of the execution of this Act
or its subsidiary legislation, have power to do all or any of the following:
18 The Computer Crimes Act 1997 basically provide for the criminalisation of illegal access to computer
(include computer hacking, and other non-consensual access to computer) and computer attacks.
19 0) have access to any program or data held in any computer, or have access to, inspect or check the
operation of, any computer and any associated apparatus or material which he has reasonable
cause to suspect is or has been in use in connection with any offence under this Act;
20 (section 11 - non-compliance with the demand is an offence punishable by a max fine twenty-five
thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both.)
(a) to require the production of records, accounts, computerised data
and documents kept by a licensee or other person and to inspect,
examine and to download from them, make copies of them or take
extracts from them;
An even wider power to access data can be found in section 73 of the CMA 1998. the
Commission may compel any person to provide information 'whether in physical form or
electronic media' 'if the Commission has reason to believe that the person ...has any
information (including but not limited to accounts and records) or any document that is
relevant to the performance of the Commission's powers and functions under this Act or
its subsidiary legislation'.
The primary concern in relation to the exercise of this power of access to information is
that the CMA 1998 give broad powers to the Commission (an 'authorise officer) to
administer the statutory powers and to prosecute a wide range of offences under the
Act. The CMAprovide specific powers of enforcement like section 233 which make it an
offence to use computer network (for example, the Internet) 'to make, creates or
solicits; and initiates transmission ... of any comment, request, suggestion or other
communication which is obscene, indecent false, menacing or offensive in character
with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person...'; as well as broad
powers such as that under section 266 ' special powers in emergency.' Although the
preamble to the CMA 1998 state that it is, 'An Act to provide for and regulate the
converging communications and multimedia industries, and for incidental matters',
section 3 of the Act contemplate the application of the statutory powers for purposes of
ensuring 'information security and network reliability and integrity.' It seems that the
Commission is expected to 'police' of communication activities in Malaysia, particularly
in reflection of Government constant resort to the Commission to assist in 'identifying'
writers of libellous or seditious e-mails.
There are various other statutory provisions which grant enforcement bodies with wide
powers to access data and information in the hand of a suspect or a third party who may
have relevant information." These provisions including those discussed immediately
above, are clearly inadequate as far the protection of individual information privacy is
concerned. Section 73 and section 254 of the CMA 1998 provide powers of access to
21 Anti-Money Laundering Act 2001 Part IV, Official Secrets Act 1972 Section 20, Customs Act 1967
(Revised- 1980) Section 111b, and Anti Corruption Act Section 28.
information without even the need for an authorisation by a judicial warrant. This could
result in the abuse of the power to access information unrelated to the actual purpose of
the provisions. In addition, the power of access to computer or computerised data is of
great concern because it enable unregulated and unaccountable access to data which
are secondary or unrelated to the investigation. Once these data are in the hand of the
enforcement body concern they may deal with the data in an unaccountable fashion -
largely because there is no regulation or no code of conduct that govern their action
once the data is in their possession (except perhaps, to a limited extent, the Official
Secrets Act 1972). In this manner, data obtained from the exercise of powers of search
or powers to compel disclosure of information as well as the powers themselves may be
use for purposes of surveillance.
Clearly, there is a need for further safeguards in terms of guidance on the handling of
the data obtained under these powers. In addition some form of scrutiny whether
judicial, legislative or institutional may be necessary to ensure that data are not
collected for surreptitious purposes, or if that is the case, that stringent controls are put
in place to prevent abuse. Beyond improving the relevant statutes, further legislative
and policy approach may be necessary to prevent abuse and to improve the protection of
information privacy.
Data practice and enforcement bodies
An extension of the issues above is the issue of governing personal data in the hand of
enforcement bodies (and even government). Other than the Official Secrets Act 1972
which govern government classified information, there is no legislation that govern data
practice by government bodies. One approach is to enact statutes that govern how
public authorities are suppose to handle personal data. Such statutory approach can be
found in the American Privacy Act 1974, the Canadian Privacy Act, and the United
Kingdom Data Protection Act 1998. The data protection principles under the United
Kingdom data protection regime (which to some extent, similar to the fair information
principles under the American and Canadian laws) would require, among all, that
individuals must be informed of the purpose of which their data are being collected; that
measures are taken to ensure the security, integrity and accuracy of the data; and that
individuals are given access to their data either for the purpose of knowing about their
existence in the hand of the data controller or for determining the accuracy of their
data.
In addition, a data protection regime would also requires that a government bodies do
not use the data under their control for purposes other than for which they are
collected. More importantly, an enforcement body would be required under a data
protection regime to be transparent as to how it collect, keep, use and dispose personal
data. In any case, a data protection would provide some degree of exemption where
data have been collected or used for purposes of criminal investigation or national
security. But this limitations are only in regards to access to such information
individuals. On the other hand, an internal supervisory bodies could be appointed to
oversee the use of personal data by enforcement bodies in order to ensure
accountability and prevent abuse. To date however, Malaysia does not have any law that
govern the collection and handling of personal data. The government has planned to
introduced a data protection legislation and a specific statute on electronic government
but there has been very little progress in this area. In addition, freedom of information
laws could be legislated to ensure public access to their information in the hand of the
government. But in the light of the persistence use of the Official Secrets Act, a
freedom of information legislation could remain a distant aspiration.
C. Surveillance in Malaysia: The Need for Governance
The previous discussions show that statutory provisions that attempt to govern or provide
for powers of surveillance have serious deficiencies in many aspects. It appears that
there has been minimal legislative effort to control the exercise of the powers of
surveillance by enforcement bodies in Malaysia. In fact, there are various forms of
surveillance methods that are yet to be regulated by laws. As already mentioned above,
there is no legislation to regulate the use of covert listening or photographic devices to
intrude into individual privacy. The growing dependence on C(TV, both as a tool of
crime prevention and surveillance, would require statutory controls or risk intrusion of
privacy and abuse of video images.e The use of covert human surveillance such as
informers and undercover infiltration would also require legislation. A number of
statutes» has provided for the protection of informers which insulate them from being
scrutinise in the court. The practice of covert human surveillance need to be regulated
in areas such as the payment of informants and the use of child informants.
In addition to improving existing laws and introducing new legislations, there is an
urgent need to create an independent supervisory body to oversee and scrutinise the
practice of surveillance by enforcement bodies. For example, under the United Kingdom
22 See for example the United Kingdom Information Commissioner CCTV Code of Practice. 2000.
23 Section 5, Anti-Money Laundering Act 2001; Section 53, Anti-Corruption Act 1997. Section 124A Customs
Act
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 three bodies are responsible for the
monitoring and review of surveillance activities: Interception of Communications
Commissioner, Office of Surveillance Commissioners and (OSC) Intelligence Services
Commissioner. Such a supervisory body could scrutinise decisions to authorised
surveillance whether made under a warrant or otherwise. The role of such an
independent supervisory body> is not simply about monitoring compliance to related
legislative powers, but also to support systemic or operational changes. In addition,
such an independent body could be required to regularly report to the legislature and
the public so that the depth and extent of surveillance in this country can be known.
Based on such reports, the legislature, if it is responsive enough, could question the
relevant Ministers about the surveillance practice of enforcement bodies under their
responsibility.
More importantly, a system of sanction and remedy delivery would also be required so
that surveillance abuse can be discouraged. Under the United Kingdom Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, an Investigatory Powers Tribunal functions to provides an
independent judicial oversight by receiving complaints from aggrieved members of
public. Such a body could make decisions in ways that balance the collective need for
security and public order against the interest of individual in their privacy. However, it is
important that such an adjudicative body is empowered to sanction surveillance abuse
and is given the power to punish specific individuals.
Conclusion
This paper has only covered a small aspects of the power of enforcement bodies to use
surveillance. Nonetheless, it shows that there are serious issues that need to be dealt
with in relation to these powers. Exercise of the powers of surveillance in Malaysia need
to be subjected to concrete judicial and democratic control. In the light of increasing
availability of sophisticated surveillance technologies and the desire to maintain security
and safety of the nation, the urge to monitor, observe and track citizens need to be
tempered with a high degree of scrutiny and accountability. Control of powers of
surveillance is necessary in the interest of protecting human rights, democratic values
and the rule of law.
H For example, part V of the RIPA 2000 requires the appointment of a judge to be the Interception of
Communications Commissioner
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